Verification

Within the field of conventional weapons, Swiss arms control and disarmament activities are primarily focused on the confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed upon within the context of the OSCE.

 
These include verification mechanisms such as the exchange of military information, mutual evaluations, inspections as well as events for cultivating contacts, the reporting and observation of military activities as well as general rules for collaboration in dealing with security policy crises.

Among other things, Switzerland has been involved in negotiating and is committed to the following OSCE regimes and documents: 

• Vienna Document 1999;
• Global exchange of military information;
• OSCE code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security;
• OSCE Principles Governing the Conventional Arms Transfer;
• Handbook of Best Practices on small arms and light weapons (2003);
• OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (2004);
• OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2008).

Switzerland is party neither to the Open Skies Treaty nor to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The verification mechanisms of the Vienna Document 1999 are important confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs).
We must distinguish between: 

• Evaluation (VD 99 § 107 - 137);
• Inspection (VD 99 § 74 - 106);
• Contacts (VD 99 § 19 - 37);
• Observation of certain military activities (VD 99 § 47 - 60).
  

The DDPS passively attends the inspections of military and civilian installations by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

According to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force on 29 April 1997, the Spiez Laboratory and other chemical plants are subject to regular inspections by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Inspections (initial, routine and challenge inspections) are carried out by the OPCW, the international control organisation resident in The Hague. The inspection teams consist of members from a variety of countries. They represent the OPCW and not their country of origin. A team consists of 3 - 6 inspectors. In the case of a challenge inspection, they are granted entry within 12 hours at the earliest, for initial or routine inspections usually within 3-5 days after the inspection request has been received.

Information exchanged on the reported installations is verified through initial and routine inspections. 'Initial inspections' refer to the first of a series of inspections. Here an agreement is prepared for the facility that is to be inspected (facility agreement). This agreement serves for planning future routine inspections.

In this context, the verification section has the following main duties to fulfil in collaboration with the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO): 

• Management of OPCW inspections involving the Spiez Laboratory or inspections of other military installations as well as challenge inspections that are primarily concerned with military facilities; 
• Support of SECO in civilian inspections (chemical industry).
  

Switzerland provides experts for implementing the Dayton Agreement in the former Yugoslavia (Art IV of Annex 1B). Until its suspension in autumn 2004, the implementation of Art II was also supported by Switzerland with 'inspectors' and 'escort assistants'.

Within the frame of Article IV (Sub-Regional Arms Control) Switzerland is contributing to regional stability as an 'assisting country'. 'Assisting countries' provide 'inspectors and escort assistants' and support and consult the inspection or escort teams.

Verification cooperation comprises on the one hand expert talks with representatives from international verification centres (also the Zentrum für Verifikation der Bundeswehr [ZVBw], the Unité française de vérification [UFV], the Italian Centro Interforze per la Verifica degli Armamenti [CIVA] or the British Joint Arms Control Implementation Group [JACIG] as main partner).

Collaboration with foreign verification centres enables us to give active support in training and operations, either by sending Swiss officers to training courses or hosting guest inspectors from foreign verification centres to meet the special verification requirements of Switzerland. Verification is also concerned with the development and extension of our own verification capacity.